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COMMENTS
APPLICATION OF DEAD MAN'S STATUTE TO WIFE
IN COMMUNITY ACTIONS BROUGHT BY HUSBAND
By NEU A. HELDiNG*
The controversial Dead Man's Statute' stands as a remnant of our
common law heritage in the law of evidence regarding witnesses. This
"safeguarding" statute has become so limited in scope and so frequently
undermined by fine semantical distinctions that it is now but a slim sentinel
upon the legal horizon. Most all of the statute's ramifications with regard
to the substantive and procedural law have been thoroughly dissected with
scientific empiricism and certainty. However, California courts have not
squarely decided upon one intriguing facet: The possible effect that Civil
Code section 161a, declaring in itself to give the wife a present, existing,
and equal interest in the community property, has had upon the Dead
Man's Statute.
The Rule Before Civil Code Section 161 a
Prior to 1927, the wife had no present and existing rights in the prop-
erty held or acquired by the marital community.' Hence, in the leading case
of Badover v. Guaranty Trust and SaVings,3 where the husband sued a
decedent's estate on a lost promissory note, the court allowed his wife to
testify, even though this was a community claim. The court based the wife's
competency to testify on the ground that as she did not have an existing
and present interest in the cause of action her plaintiff husband was assert-
ing, the Dead Man's Statute had no application. The pertinent part of this
statute is as follows :'
The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(3) Parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, or persons
in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted, against the estate of
a deceased person, as to any matter or fact occurring before the death of
such deceased. (Emphasis added.)
The effect of the Badover case was that even though a community claim
was being pursued, the wife did not have such an interest as would label her
a person upon whose behalf the action was brought, thereby precluding her
from testifying.
* Member, Third-Year Class.
1 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1880(3).2 Crocker First Natl Bank v. United States, 183 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1950); Spreckels v.
Spreckels, 172 Cal. 775, 158 Pac. 537 (1916). See also United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315
(1926) (excellent discussion of pre-1927 California community property).
3 186 Cal. 775, 200 Pac. 638 (1921).
4 See note I supra.
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The court cited Uhlkorn v. Goodman,5 which held that one having a
joint interest in a contract with the plaintiff was an incompetent witness
as the action was against a decedent's estate. The obvious reason was that
the witness would be a person upon whose behalf the action was brought.
Although this is clearer case of a witness falling under the Dead Man's
Statute, it might serve to illustrate, by way of dicta, the judicial thought
in the Badover case.
The 1927 Legislative Enactment
In 1927 Civil Code section 161a was enacted.' This section reads as
follows:
The respective interests of the husband and wife in community property
during continuance of the marital relation are present, existing, and equal
interests under the management and control of the husband as is provided
in sections 172 and 172a of the Civil Code. This section shall be construed
as defining the respective interests and rights of husband and wife in com-
munity property. (Emphasis added.)
Although the language used seems to show a clear intent to give the wife a
present, existing interest, the exact effect of this section has not been pre-
cisely determined, with the cases merely assuming the wife's interest to be
present and equal with that of her husband.' For example, the wife is
deemed to have a present, existing interest for federal tax purposes.8 In
Odone v. Marzocchi,9 where the wife had effected a gift of her interest in
community property to a long-time friend, the court declared the wife's
interest to be "present, existing, and equal, although the management and
control of the community are in the husband." In Estate of Kelley,"° the
District Court of Appeal declared in regard to the wife's rights to half of
the community property acquired after 1927 that it "never did belong to
the husband." However, it has been held that the wife's trustee in bank-
ruptcy can not force a division of the community assets acquired after 1927
for the payment of the wife's debts." Most writers feel that Civil Code
section 16 la accomplished what it purported to do; that is, it gave the wife
a present, existing interest in community property. 2 The judicial opinions
have uniformly held that Civil Code section 161a does not affect the re-
5 84 Cal. 185, 23 Pac. 1114 (1890).
6 Cal. Stat. 1927, c. 265, p.484.
7 Strong v. Strong, 22 Cal. 2d 540,140 P.2d 386 (1943) ; Horton v. Horton, 115 Cal. App. 2d
360, 252 P.2d 397 (1953); Estate of Cushing, 113 Cal. App. 2d 319, 248 P.2d 482 (1952);
Cooke v. Cooke, 65 Cal. App. 2d 260, 150 P.2d 514 (1944) ; Colden v. Costello, 50 Cal. App. 2d
363, 122 P.2d 959 (1942) ; Mosesian v. Parker, 44 Cal. App. 2d 544, 112 P.2d 705 (1941).
8 United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931).
9 34 Cal. 2d 431, 211 P.2d 297 (1949).
10 122 Cal. App. 2d 42, 264 P.2d 210 (1953).
11Smedberg v. Bevilockway, 7 Cal. App. 2d 578, 46 P.2d 820 (1935); Comment, 23 So.
CALTF. L. REv. 237 (1950).
12 Kirkwood, The Owuzership of Community Property in California, 7 So. CALA'. L. REv. 1
(1933); Comment, 22 CAixF. L. REv. 404 (1933).
[Vol. 10THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
spective interests of the husband and wife in community property acquired
before 1927.13
Manford v. Coats,' decided in 1935, was the first case to provide an
opportunity for an appellate court to apply the new Civil Code section to
the Dead Man's Statute. The trial court had allowed the wife to testify in
a suit brought by her husband on a community claim inasmuch as she at-
tested solely to events which had transpired before 1927. The District Court
of Appeal, in affirming, held that there was enough other evidence to sup-
port the finding, and chose not to discuss what the result would have been
had the wife been allowed to testify to matters occurring after 1927. The
court noted that prior to 1927, the wife was clearly a competent witness for
her plaintiff husband in a community action against a decedent's estate,
citing the Badover case as controlling.
"Relinquishmrent" Doctrine
After seven years of suspense, a more ideal fact situation was presented
in Roy v. Salisbury.:5 This was an action against an estate for the keeping
and caring for the decedent's Doberman Pinscher at the plaintiff's kennel.
Six months after the decedent's death, Mrs. Roy, wife of the plaintiff, exe-
cuted an agreement to the effect that any claim against the estate of the
deceased and all the proceeds that might be recovered therefrom were to be
the separate property of her husband. At the trial an objection was made
that Mrs. Roy was incompetent to testify under the Dead Man's Statute,
as she was an assignor of the party bringing the action in having bestowed
her half-interest upon her plaintiff husband. This objection was overruled
and the trial court found an oral contract and awarded the decision to the
plaintiff, Roy. On appeal the appellants argued that Civil Code section 161a
prevented the wife from testifying in such an action. They urged that be-
fore the husband-wife agreement, the wife had a present, existing interest
in the claim now being asserted, and therefore was either an "assignor" or
a "party upon whose behalf the action was prosecuted."
The respondents maintained that the wife can "relinquish" her rights
to the husband to obviate the effect of an assignment, citing Perkins v.
Sunset Tel. and Tel. Co.
16
The Supreme Court of California held that Mrs. Roy's testimony, even
if it had been admitted erroneously because of the combined effects of the
Dead Man's Statute and Civil Code section 161a, still was not prejudicial
so as to constitute reversible error. There was enough competent evidence
to support the decision. The Perkins case was cited as controlling on the
"relinquishment" doctrine, whereby the wife might give her half-interest
13 Stewart v. Stewart, 204 Cal. 546, 269 Pac. 439 (1928) ; Spanfelner v. Meyer, 51 Cal.
App.2d 390, 124 P.2d 862 (1942); Level v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 118 Cal.App. 426,
5 P.2d 430 (1931).
146 Cal.App.2d 743, 45 P.2d 395 (1935).
15 21 Cal. 2d 176, 130 P.2d 706 (1942).
16 155 Cal. 712, 103 Pac. 190 (1909).
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to her husband that he might hold such as his separate property.'7 The
opinion was neither clear on whether under the Dead Man's Statute a "re-
linquishment" was to be treated in effect as an assignment, nor precise as
to the possible effect of Civil Code section 161a.
Justice Traynor delivered a persuasive dissenting opinion,18 maintain-
ing that Mrs. Roy should have not been allowed to testify under the com-
bined effects of Civil Code section 161a and the Dead Man's Statute. He
distinguished the Perkins case on the ground that it in no way concerned
an action against a decedent's estate. He felt that any change in the Dead
Man's Statute is the function of the legislature, not the court. And that
under the present Dead Man's Statute construed in terms of Civil Code
section 161a, the trial court erred in allowing Mrs. Roy to testify as a wit-
ness for her plaintiff husband.
In August of 1957 the question as to the competency of the wife to tes-
tify in such a situation arose again in Williams v. Security-First National
Bank.' This suit was brought by the husband against a decedent's estate.
The recovery if any would be community property. The Appellate Depart-
ment of the Superior Court of Kern County intimated that error was com-
mitted by allowing the wife's testimony in the trial court. However, the
three-judge court held the evidence other than that founded upon the tes-
timony of the wife would support the judgment. This followed the well-
established mode of avoiding the issue of the wife's competency which
started in the Manford case.
The Problem Unsolved
It would seem that the problem above presented concerning the com-
petency of the wife in community actions brought by her husband against
a decedent's estate should have been rather summarily disposed of by Cali-
fornia courts. When Probate Code sections 201 and 202 were amended in
1923,20 giving the surviving wife one-half of the community property by
succession,' one justice intimated that even this might give the wife enough
of an interest so as to make her subject to the provisions of the Dead Man's
Statute in suits upon community claims brought by her husband against a
decedent's estate.2 2 For example, if the community recovered $100.00, the
surviving wife could take one-half of this by succession. Even a cursory
examination would seem to reveal that the wife could hardly be classed as
a "disinterested" witness in such an action. She might well fail within the
Dead Man's Statute, being a "person on whose behalf an action is prose-
cuted." No case has been found that seriously considered this argument
17 See Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Cal. 2d 254, 273 P.2d 257 (1954).
1821 Cal. 2d at 187, 130 P.2d at 712.
19 153 Cal. App. 2d 900, 314 P.2d 1020 (1957).
20 Cal. Stat. 1923, c. 18, p. 29. These were formerly Civil Code sections 1401 and 1402.
21 See In re Moffitt, 153 Cal. 359, 95 Pac. 653 (1908); Cunha v. Hughes, 122 Cal. 111,
54 Pac. 535 (1898) ; Estate of Burdick, 112 Cal. 387, 44 Pac. 734 (1896).
2 2
Cutting v. Bryan, 206 Cal. 254, 274 Pac. 326 (1929).
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except Cutting v. Bryan,2 and that court concluded that the wife was at
that time a competent witness. Rather, the courts have been content to
observe that these Probate Code sections do not give the wife any present
interest, thus seemingly requiring a present, existing interest before she
would be subject to the narrow construction usually given the Dead Man's
Statute.2
In the Badover case, there was an important dictum by the court in
regard to a present interest affecting the wife's competency as a witness in
a community action pursued by her husband against a decedent's estate
which could have served as a judicial predetermination of the entire
problem.15
... [A] n action against an executor or administrator, on a claim against
a deceased person is one brought "on behalf of" any person not a party to
the action who, nevertheless, has an existing property right in the claim.
(Emphasis added.)
Civil Code section 161a states that the respective interests of the husband
and wife in community property are present, existing, and equal interests.
Viewing this dictum in the light of this section, a near compelling conclusion
is reached that section 16 la should squarely place the wife within the Cali-
fornia Dead Man's Statute where community actions against a decedent's
estate are brought by the husband. Furthermore, in Coffer v. Lightforae
the District Court of Appeal held that a divorcee could not utilize her for-
mer spouse as a witness in an action brought against his father's estate.
The divorcee had acquired the former community claim through the pro-
visions of Civil Code section 146, which provides substantially for an as-
signment upon dissolution of the community from one spouse to the other,
according to the court's decree. By way of dicta, the court concluded that
at the time the claim was one of the community, the husband clearly would
have been an incompetent witness in an action brought by his wife against
his deceased father's estate. Thus it seems that the courts would not hesi-
tate in holding that the husband was subject to the Dead Man's Statute in
community actions brought by his wife against a decedent's estate on the
theory that he is a person on whose behalf the action is prosecuted. At least
it seems that the court in the Coffer case would not hesitate. Why should
not the wife occupy the same position when her husband is bringing the
community action against a decedent's estate?
Other jurisdictions Compared
Other jurisdictions having both community property and a somewhat
similar Dead Man's Statute reach sure-footed results, but these states have
23 Ibid.
2 4 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Fancher, 219 Cal. 351, 26 P.2d 482 (1933) ; Trimble v. Trimble,
219 Cal. 340, 26 P.2d 477 (1933).
25 186 Cal. at 781, 200 Pac. at 640.
26 129 Cal. App. 2d 191, 276 P.2d 618 (1954).
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not had any modifications of their community property law; that is, the
wife has always had a present, existing interest in the property held by the
marital community.'
In 1954, the case of Boettcher v. Busse28 was argued in the courts of
the state of Washington. In a code section substantially the same as the
California Dead Man's Statute,29 the court held squarely that the wife
could not testify as to an alleged oral conversation between the decedent
and her plaintiff husband. Any recovery would be community property. The
Washington courts have apparently been consistent in the above result for
a long time. The basis for their holding has been that the wife was equally
interested in the outcome of the action and, therefore, a party on whose
behalf the action is brought.3
In Tannehill v. Tannehill,31 a Texas case, the court would not permit
the husband to testify as to an alleged gift made to his wife by her deceased
brother. The theory was that although the property itself would be the
wife's separate property, the rents received therefrom under the existing
Texas law would be community property. This was held to be enough of an
interest so as to place the husband within the prohibition of the Dead Man's
Statute and render him incompetent as a witness for his wife.
Conclusiont
Essentially there appear to be two solutions to this dilemma. One would
be to abolish the California Dead Man's Statute through legislative means.
Many writers and practitioners have favored this course of action. The
other method would be to establish a line of judicial determinations in the
light of the existing statutes, common sense, fair play and logic, and deci-
sively hold that the wife is an incompetent witness through the operation
of the Dead Man's Statute in community actions pursued by her husband
against a decedent's estate. Preciseness and clear definition are two goals
that should be of prime importance to the bench and bar alike.
27 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1931) (Washington); Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122
(1931) (Texas).
2845 Wash. 2d 579, 277 P.2d 368 (1954).2 9 VASH REV. CODES § 5.60.030 (1951).
3 0 Andrews v. Andrews, 116 Wash. 513, 199 Pac. 981 (1921) ; Whitney v. Priest, 26 Wash.
48, 66 Pac. 108 (1901).
31 171 S.W. 1050 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
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